The plaintiff was walking her daughter's dog, a Cavalier King Charles Spaniel, on a leash in the parking lot of a vacation apartment she had rented from the defendant. At the same time, the defendant was walking her own dog, an Australian Shepherd, off-leash, toward the parking lot. As the defendant rounded the northeast corner of the building, she briefly lost sight of her dog, whereupon it grabbed the plaintiff's dog by the scruff of the neck and pulled her away. The plaintiff held onto the leash, was pulled along, and fell, suffering a wedge compression fracture of the twelfth thoracic vertebra, which healed with a malalignment of at least 34°.
The lower courts had ordered the defendant, based on her liability as the animal's owner, to pay €41,767.60 plus expenses and care costs, and had established her liability for future damages arising from the accident. Any further claims by the plaintiff were dismissed. The defendant appealed this judgment by way of an extraordinary appeal, which was rejected by the Supreme Court for lack of a significant legal issue.
The Supreme Court (OGH) first established that the alleged deficiencies in the appeal proceedings did not exist. In principle, an animal owner must exercise the objectively required care when keeping and supervising their animal. If they fail to prove that they did not act unlawfully, they are also liable for unlawful behavior by their animal, even if that behavior is not their fault. The decisive factors are the characteristics of the animal, the potential for harm, and the specific circumstances of the individual case. The more dangerous an animal is, the greater the duty of care, although the requirements must not be excessive. The specific nature of the duty of care is generally a matter to be determined on a case-by-case basis and rarely justifies referral to the Supreme Court, unless a gross misjudgment by the appellate court is evident.
In the present decision, the lower courts assessed the situation as follows: the defendant was required to either keep her dog on a leash on the premises of her accommodation establishment or at least within earshot and sight so that she could influence its behavior if necessary. The defendant's brief loss of sight of the dog meant that she could no longer effectively control its behavior, thus breaching her objectively required duty of care. This was consistent with the principles established by the Supreme Court, according to which a dog does not necessarily have to be leashed during walks in open areas, but the person supervising it must be able to control the animal by voice command at any time. According to the findings, the defendant was unable to meet this requirement, which established liability.
The Supreme Court also pointed out that the dog owner's liability does not require that the animal had previously been dangerous or disobedient. Even dogs previously known to be good-natured must be supervised in such a way as to prevent damage. Furthermore, it was irrelevant that the defendant assumed she would not have to expect such incidents on her own property; as a landlord of holiday apartments, she had to assume that guests might bring their dogs. There was no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, as the appeal did not contain a legally binding objection on this point.
Regarding the compensation for pain and suffering, the Supreme Court clarified that it is essentially a one-time payment for all pain suffered and its anticipated duration. The Supreme Court deemed the award of €41,767.60 appropriate, as the plaintiff must expect to continue experiencing pain, limited mobility, the use of walking aids, and the need for care. Comparable figures from other cases serve only as guidelines and are not a binding basis for calculation, particularly in cases of differing injuries.
The defendant's liability as animal owner for the accident and the amount of awarded compensation for pain and suffering therefore remain in effect.
Supreme Court 16.12.2025, 4Ob163/25m